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INTRODUCTION

In 1905 Louis D. Brandeis delivered a talk entitled The Opportunity in the Law to the Harvard Ethical Society.' It was delivered as a
pep-talk, what Harvard Law Professor Duncan Kennedy, seventy-six
years later, would refer to as "the old address to the troops." 2 Brandeis
hoped to rally law students to his vision of the moral possibilities of
legal practice-specifically, the elite corporate legal practice into which
Brandeis could assume his audience would enter. Brandeis was concerned that elite lawyers were becoming thralls of robber-baron capitalists, that they were ignoring the possibilities of law practice as a kind of
public service and redefining the ethics of their profession to encompass
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. This paper originally was written for the Hastings Center project on professional ethics and the public role of the professions. The project was supported by the Walter and
Elise Haas Fund. The Author would like to thank Robert Gordon, Michael Kelly, Susan Wolf, and
the participants in the Hastings Center project for their extremely valuable comments on earlier
drafts of this paper.

1. L.

BRANDEIS,

The Opportunity in the Law, in

BUSINESS-A PROFESSION

315 (1914).

2. Kennedy, Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm from Within, 33
HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 36, 36 (1981).
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little more than the principle of unadulterated loyalty to their clients-a redefinition that, not incidentally, generated great personal
wealth for the lawyers themselves.
My purpose in this Article is to elaborate and defend a version of
Brandeis' vision of the opportunity in the law. What was this vision?
What transformations and redefinitions has it undergone? Why is
it-as I believe--in contemporary eclipse? Most importantly for the
subject of this Symposium: can this vision be resurrected as a public
philosophy for the legal profession or, at least, for the influential stra-3
tum of the legal profession consisting of large-firm corporate lawyers?
II. THE LAWYER AS AN ARISTOCRAT
We begin, as is customary and inevitable, with de Tocqueville's famous description in 1835 of the legal profession as the American aristocracy. De Tocqueville had in mind by this metaphor the fact that
lawyers predominated in American public life in much the same way
that aristocrats predominated in the public life of the anciens regimes;
lawyers were a kind of functional equivalent of the aristocracy. According to de Tocqueville, this functional equivalence extended beyond activity in public life: lawyers and nobles also shared a "conservative and
anti-democratic" cast of mind and a "secret contempt of the government of the people."'4 In addition, both lawyers and aristocrats valued
order above liberty; lawyers were "less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrary power." 5 As Judith Shklar comments on de Tocqueville's point:
"if they [lawyers] fear tyranny, it is because it tends to be arbitrary, not
because it is repressive."' 6 From de Tocqueville's point of view, this predilection for order over liberty made the lawyers an ideal group to beat
down the people's ill-considered enthusiasms and thereby curb "encroaching democracy." According to de Tocqueville, lawyers are intermediate between the government and the people, because lawyers
"belong to the people by birth and interest, and to the aristocracy by
habit and taste; they may be looked upon as the connecting link between the two great classes in society."'7 The functional role played by
lawyers in de Tocqueville's conservative scheme was to blunt or miti3.

Little of the historical story I have to tell in this Article is original. I draw my inspiration

in large part from R. Gordon, Lawyers as the American Aristocracy (unpublished lectures, used
with the author's permission). I have also been influenced by Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The
Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985). My hope is to make explicit the

philosophical and social-theoretic underpinnings of the vision of law practice that emerges in
Brandeis' speech and Gordon's larger narrative.
4. 1 A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273-74 (P. Bradley 1st ed. 1945).
5. Id. at 275.
6. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 15 (1964).
7.

1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 275-76.
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gate class conflict by pressing state violence into the mold of legality
and legality into the service of antipopulism.
Like so much else in Democracy in America, de Tocqueville's analysis amounts to a prescription cloaked as narration or travelogue. Split
apart for analytic purposes, it encompasses six propositions: first, lawyers, like aristocrats, have a calling higher than mere bourgeois commercialism; second, lawyers mediate between the government and the
people; third, lawyers, like aristocrats, assume a responsibility for the
common good through public life; fourth, the common good will be realized by "mitigating the tyranny of the majority"8 and repressing popular liberty in the name of order, while rendering princely power regular
and nonarbitrary; fifth, the tyranny of the majority must be mitigated
by curbing the people; and, sixth, lawyers are peculiarly suited by training and cast of mind to this task.
III. THE LAWYER AS A PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SERVANT
The pre-Civil War American lawyers fulfilled their public role as
de Tocqueville suggested they would-through participation in public
life, primarily by holding public office. After the war, however, the elite
bar ended its specifically political involvement and went to work instead for robber-baron capitalists. The modern corporate lawyer was
born.
Our stereotype of these original corporate lawyers is not a pleasant
one. We think of them primarily as lackeys of the most vile sort, typified by William C. Guthrie telling the Pinkertons in 1885 that they had
a constitutional right and perhaps a duty(!) to shoot down the Knights
of Labor at Homestead. The historian Mark DeWolfe Howe refers to
this episode as "Guthrie's efforts to cut the constitutional cloth to the
measure of his clients' needs." 9
According to this stereotype, in the words of Howe, "lawyers lost
the persuasion of their ancestors that the profession possesses other responsibilities than those owing to their clients."'10 The transformation of
the lawyer-as-quasi-autonomous-advisor, who could be a public actor as
well as private counsel, into the lawyer-as-hired-gun is typified above
all by the introduction of a formal ethical duty to maintain client confidences-a duty that was wholly absent from the primary pre-Civil War
treatises on legal ethics."
8. Id. at 271.
9. Howe, Book Review, 60 HA.v. L. REv. 838, 841 (1947) (reviewing 1 R
CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS,

10.

SWAINE, THE

1819-1947 (1946)).

Id. at 840.

11. See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 94243 (1980). Later, Patterson suggests an interesting argument that the duty of undivided loyalty
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Robert Gordon's research on the New York City bar, however,
demonstrates that this stereotype is misleading. The elite Wall Street
bar was in fact heavily involved in the Progressive and Mugwump reform movements, even when these activities ran counter to the interests
of their clients. According to Gordon,
Wall Street lawyers were primarily responsible for creating the state commissions
regulating railroads (Simon Sterne), city subway construction (Edward Sheperd),
public utilities (Charles Evans Hughes and a corps of young lawyers pulled out of
practice onto his Governor's staff), . . and at the federal level probably the most
important and permanently influential work of bureaucratic architecture of the
time was the effort of two more Wall Street lawyers, Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, to centralize professional control over the War Department and remove it from
Congressional influence. . . . The entire leadership of the New York bar in the
1880s and 90s, almost 200 lawyers, was active in law reform, social reform, and
political reform movements ...
11

Now it would surely be false to see these lawyers as unalloyed dogooders, just as it is wrong to see them as mere lickspittles of laissezfaire. No matter how impressive his Progressive credentials, Elihu Root
is remembered primarily for his Guthrie-like adage that "[t]he client
never wants to be told he can't do what he wants to do; he wants to be
told how to do it, and it is the lawyer's business to tell him how."' 3
Perhaps it would be most accurate to view the elite late-nineteenthcentury bar as a somewhat schizophrenic mix of public spirit and private service-and its ideology an equally bewildering mix of progressivism and Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics.
This sets the context for Brandeis' Harvard talk. It is important to
realize that Brandeis himself has always been considered a kind of
Golden Age hero, who was able to hold together the conflicting ideals of
public and private practice in a magnificent synthesis or dynamic tension. To many lawyers Brandeis is still the ideal of what greatness is:
worldly success combined with public service. No one was better suited
to articulate the public philosophy of his profession.
IV.

THE BRANDEIS VISION AND PROGRESSIVE PROFESSIONALISM

A.

Brandeis' Harvard Speech

Brandeis began his Harvard talk by outlining the ways in which a
lawyer's training "fits him especially to grapple with the questions
was created by the robber-baron era corporate bar, introduced for the convenience of those clients.
Id. at 948-55. I believe that the duty of confidentiality owed to organizational clients has little to
recommend it. D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study ch. 10 (forthcoming) (duty of
confidentiality arises from the demands of individual human dignity; these demands do not transfer to the organizational client); see also supra Shaffer, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 698-709 (1988).
12. R. Gordon, supra note 3, at 25.
13. 1 R. SWAINE, supra note 9, at 667.
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which are presented in a democracy.

' 14

In Brandeis' view, the unique

combination of abstract reasoning ability and empirical keenness, coupled with the necessity of reaching conclusions in real time, perfectly
suits the lawyer for public life. Moreover,
[i]f the lawyer's practice is a general one, his field of observation extends, in course
of time, into almost every sphere of business and of life.. . . He not only sees men
of all kinds, but knows their deepest secrets; sees them in situations which "try
men's souls." He is apt to become a good judge of men.15

Finally, "the practice of law tends to make the lawyer judicial in attitude and extremely tolerant."' Taken together, these traits make the
lawyer an embodiment of Aristotelian phronesis, "practical wisdom."
For this reason, "the lawyer has acquired a position materially different
from that of other men. It is the position of the adviser of men.""'
The obvious element of wishful overstatement in Brandeis' characterization of lawyers should not detract from its element of truth. Brandeis' notion of "the opportunity in the law" is derived from his account
of the lawyer's unique credentials: lawyers have the opportunity to
make the law better by engaging in law-reform activity, and to make
their clients better by acting as advisors to awaken clients to the public
dimension of their activities and to steer clients in the direction of the
public good. Rather than acting as a hired gun for the client, the lawyer
should occupy a more judicious (and judicial) role, and become what
Brandeis later came to call the "lawyer for the situation."'"
The invocation of those hoary twins, law reform and client counseling, is enough to bring a yawn to the face of many people. But Brandeis
suggests more than a pair of vacuities; he is also clear about the direction that law reform and client counseling should take: "We hear much
of the 'corporation lawyer,' and far too little of the 'people's lawyer.'
The great opportunity of the American Bar is and will be to stand again
as it did in the past, ready to protect also the interests of the people."' 9
In Brandeis' view, the private sector in an industrial democracy raises
political threats comparable to those that democrats faced in their confrontations with the various anciens r~gimes. Behind Brandeis' call for
14. L. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 315.
15. Id. On the lawyer's phroensis,see Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHL L. RE V.835,
846-73 (1987).
16. L. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 317.
17. Id.
18. Brandeis coined the term "lawyer for the situation" at his confirmation hearings for the
Supreme Court. When accused of unethical law practice for simultaneously representing several
parties to the same transactions, Brandeis replied that he viewed himself as counsel for the situation rather than for any single party. See Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 683 (1965).

19. L. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 321.
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his audience to become people's lawyers as well as corporation lawyers
is his idea that the people's struggle with the corporations is one more
step in the centuries-old battle against absolutism.
It is important to realize, though, that Brandeis did not view the
requirement to become a people's lawyer as arising from any partisanship for the people. In this respect, Brandeis is more closely aligned to
de Tocqueville than their diametrically opposed views of which side the
lawyer should take in the class struggle (and why not use this term?)
might initially lead us to believe. Brandeis was worried about civil unrest, and possibly revolution:
The immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility from which much
trouble will come to us unless the excesses of capital are curbed, through the respect for law, as the excesses of democracy were curbed seventy-five years ago.
There will come a revolt of the people against the capitalists, unless the aspirations
of the people are given some adequate legal expression; and to this end cooperation
of the abler lawyers is essential."0

This passage indicates that Brandeis was concerned with saving capitalism by giving it a human face: he was not concerned first and foremost
with "the people" as such. Indeed, the emphasized phrase shows that, if
circumstances (such as what H.L. Mencken called the "Jacksonian jacquerie" of de Tocqueville's time) dictate, the lawyer should weigh in on
the side of wealth, against "the people." Brandeis' political philosophy
was in fact a mixture of democratic ideals and social engineering.2 1 The
passage quoted above emphasizes the latter in a rather unalloyed form:
the lawyer stands outside the fray, observing the clash of interestgroups, then makes the proper adjustments in order to stabilize the
mechanism. This is truly the "lawyer for the situation."
A remarkable instance from Brandeis' own career illustrates what
he meant by "lawyer for the situation." Brandeis was retained by William McElwain, owner of a large shoe company, to assist in a labor dispute that arose when McElwain's employees refused to accept a wage
cut he proposed during the 1902 business downturn. Brandeis visited
the factory and discovered that though McElwain's employees were
paid at a high rate when they worked, their work was seasonal and
irregular.
He was shocked to find that McElwain did not know his workers' yearly income.
"You say your factory cannot pay the wages the men have been earning," he
thundered at McElwain. "How much money do they lose through irregularities in
their work? You don't know? Do you undertake to manage this business and to say
what wages it can afford to pay while you are ignorant of facts such as these? Are
not these things that you should have understood and that you should have seen
20. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
21. But see P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANaEis: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 406-16 (1984) (emphasizing the democratic elements in Brandeis' thinking).
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that your men too understood, before you went into this fight?" He called in John
Tobin, the head of the International Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, who was acting as the striking workers' representative. Tobin's version of the situation-relatively high but seasonal wages-was the same as McElwain's. When
Tobin finished his recital, Brandeis, the employer's lawyer, startled the labor leader
by commenting, "You're perfectly right."2

Brandeis gave McElwain detailed advice about how to spread the work
out over the year. "The net result was that the factory was kept operating 305 days every year, wages were both substantial and regular, the
business prospered, and McElwain, Tobin, and the workers were
satisfied.

'23

A memorandum entitled "The Practice of the Law," in Brandeis'
own handwriting, virtually blueprints Brandeis' handling of this matter.
In part, the memorandum reads: "Don't believe client witness-Examine Documents... Know not only those facts which bear
on direct controversy, but know all facts that Surround. Advise client
what he should have-not what he wants. ' 4 Brandeis' approach to McElwain's problem perfectly exemplifies the startling mix of humanitarianism and disinterested social engineering that together constituted the
"lawyer for the situation" who would save capitalism from itself.
B. ProgressiveProfessionalism
As William Simon points out, Brandeis and the other progressive
lawyers shared a set of beliefs that has much in common with functionalist sociology, 25 especially that of Talcott Parsons. According to the
functionalists' public philosophy, professional structures emerge in response to social needs, rather than professional self-interest. The functionalists stressed that the professional's specialized knowledge itself
mandates certain behavior that has nothing to do with the professional's economic enrichment. This functionalist philosophy is reminiscent of de Tocqueville as well as Brandeis, and we may distill several
functionalist elements from Brandeis' speech that correspond to de
Tocqueville's six propositions.
First, both the functionalists and the progressive lawyers insisted
that the profession must not be commercialized, that purely economic
motivation was either pernicious

26

or fictitious. 27 Second, both the func-

22. Id. at 96-97.
23. Id. at 97.
24. Id. at 40. This last sentence forms an astounding counterpoint to Elihu Root's "The client never wants to be told he can't do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it
is the lawyer's business to tell him how." See supra text accompanying note 13.
25. Simon, supra note 3.
26. See E. DURKHEIM, DMSION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 1 (G. Simpson trans. 1933). I regard
Durkheim as a proto-functionalist.
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tionalists and the progressive lawyers viewed the legal profession as a
link between private and public interests, with the former personified
by clients and the latter by the laws.28 Third, because of this unique
position, members of the legal profession have an ethical responsibility
to counsel clients and modify laws for the common good.2" Fourth, the
common good will be realized, in a society such as the United States, by
blunting or mitigating conflict, specifically class conflict; 30 Brandeis espoused this theme as did de Tocqueville.3 ' Fifth, this mitigation of class
conflict will be accomplished by eradicating extremes of wealth and
poverty; thus Brandeis' progressive call for elite lawyers to become people's lawyers as well as corporation lawyers (although, as we have seen,
this is not because of any identification with the people). The most conspicuous element of Brandeis' public philosophy is a commitment to
progressive politics, that is, a politics of redistribution within the
framework of capitalism. It is a distinctively liberal public philosophy.
One important difference between Brandeis and the functionalists
lies in their respective analyses of why lawyers should play the crucial
role proposed for them. The functionalists ascribed the legal profession's fitness for the task of reconciling public and private interests to
the centrality of law-in Gordon's words, "the belief that a legal system
pursues, and its products reveal, immanent social purposes; that to all
social conflicts there are efficient structural-functional solutions that
harmonize with these purposes-the long-run needs of the society and
'3 2
its evolving public values.
27. See T. PARSONS, The Motivation of Economic Activities, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 50-68 (rev. ed. 1954); see also id. at 62-64 (discussing the professions). In the title essay of
Business-A Profession,supra note 1, Brandeis argues that even businessmen should not be motivated primarily by a spirit of commercialism.
28. See T. PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICA
THEORY, 370, 375, 384 (rev. ed. 1954).
29. A.A. Berle, Jr. was perhaps the leading exponent of the ethical importance of client counseling. See, e.g., Hazeltine, Radin & Berle, Legal Profession and Legal Education, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 345 (1933); Berle, For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1371-72 (1932).
30. T. PARSONS, supra note 28, at 378 (indicating that "U]ust as from a certain point of view
the law-making process itself is a mechanism for settling conflicts in the society and establishing
rules, so then the legal profession is a kind of 'secondary' line of defense against the disruptive
consequences of conflict").
31. This is one of the most ancient conceptions of the function of law, appearing originally in
PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO (T. Pangle trans. 1980). Plato argued that a communist society would
be best, id. at 739c-d, but is too utopian to hope for, id. at 739d-e. Hence there must be unequal
classes. Id. at 744b. Because factionalism and class war will inevitably destroy a city unless it is
governed by the rule of law, not of men, id. at 715d, the lawmakers must attempt to reconcile the
conflicting elements of society, even at the expense of justice. Id. at 627a-28c. Lawmakers will
effect this reconciliation by eradicating extremes of wealth and poverty. Id. at 744d-e.
32. R. Gordon, supra note 3, at 21-22. For the view that a legal system pursues and reveals
immanent social purposes, see E. DURKHEIM, supra note 26, in which the author claims method-
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Brandeis, on the other hand, does not ground the central role he
ascribes to lawyers in a social theory of the legal system as such; rather,
as we have seen, he derives it from the fact that the lawyer possesses
phronesis. It is the lawyer's cast of mind, not the central position of the
legal system, that suits the lawyer so very well to public service. In this
respect, Brandeis is closer to de Tocqueville than to the functionalists.
Indeed, the six elements I have just enumerated, with the striking exception of political progressivism, are virtually identical to those we
found in de Tocqueville's description of the American legal profession. I
might add that this difference between Brandeis and the functionalists
redounds to Brandeis' benefit. The functionalist claim that the legal
system represents society's collective consciousness, or is central to the
normative integration of society, is open to serious doubt, while Brandeis' enumeration of the lawyer's special qualities of mind-logical
thinking, a nose for facts, good judgment of people, toleration-rings
true."3
In sum, the public philosophy for the legal profession proposed by
Brandeis consists of these six beliefs: first, professionalism is better
than commercialism; second, lawyers are mediators between public and
private interests; third, lawyers therefore have a special responsibility
to the common good; fourth, the common good will be realized by
blunting class antagonisms within a fundamentally capitalist framework; fifth, in an era of high capitalism, class antagonisms must be
blunted by promoting the interests of the people against those of the
corporations; and, sixth, lawyers are peculiarly suited by training and
cast of mind to this task. In the remainder of this Article, I shall refer
to this constellation of six elements as "progressive professionalism. 3 4
ologically that the law is a manifestation of the collective consciousness. For the belief in efficient
solutions, see also T. PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 34 (rev. ed. 1954).
33. For very different attacks on the functionalist claims, see R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY chs. 2, 3 (1976), and some of the writings of Niklas Luhmann, who is the most distinguished contemporary functionalist; see, e.g., N. LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 230-73

(E. King & M. Albrow trans. 1985); N. LUHMANN, Positive Law and Ideology and The Autonomy of
the Legal System, in THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 90, 122 (S. Holmes & C. Larmore trans.
1982); Luhmann, The Legal Profession: Comments on the Situation in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 20 JURID. REV. 116-32 (1975).
34. I use this term rather than Gordon's "Progressive Purposivism," supra note 3, at 21, or
Simon's "Progressive Functionalism," supra note 3, at 565-68, because of the sixth element of the
constellation, which is different from the functionalist and purposivist views. While these views
stressed the role of law as a mode of social integration, Brandeis stressed the mental qualities of
lawyers.
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The Technocratic and Legitimacy Visions of Progressive
Professionalism

Brandeis' Harvard speech promoted what I will call the "technocratic vision" of progressive professionalism. Implicit in this view is the

notion that lawyers should use their unique position in society to engineer social change. However, Brandeis' is not the only version of progressive professionalism. Another member of the legal pantheon,

Reginald Heber Smith, a corporate lawyer from Harvard who created
the modern legal aid movement, offered a different version of progressive professionalism.

5

In his celebrated book Justice and the Poor,

Smith wrote:
The essentially conservative bench and bar will vehemently deny any suggestion
that there is no law for the poor, but, as the legal aid societies know, such is the
belief to-day of a multitude of humble, entirely honest people, and in the light of
their experience it appears as the simple truth.

The end of such a course is disclosed by history. Differences in the ability
of classes to use the machinery of the law, if permitted to remain, lead inevitably to
disparity between the rights of classes in the law itself. And when the law recognizes and enforces
a distinction between classes, revolution ensues or democracy is
8
at an end.3

Smith, like Brandeis, was worried about class war and revolution. But
unlike Brandeis, Smith was not concerned with social unrest as merely
an engineering problem that required re-equilibration of the machine.
Smith was concerned, rather, that the existing situation was unjust and
unfair.
To register this contrast, let us call Smith's version of progressive
professionalism the "legitimacy vision" just as Brandeis' version is the

"technocratic vision.13 7 Implicit in Smith's book is the idea that, barred
from access to the law, the people would be right to revolt.", At issue is

the legitimacy of government, and that legitimacy must be tested
against the life experience of the least-well-off in society.39 According to
35. For a description of Smith's role in the history of legal aid in the United States, see E.
JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE

OEO

LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

(1974).
R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 11-12 (3d ed. 1924) (footnotes omitted).
37. Let me emphasize that Brandeis was also a democrat, and I am highlighting the technocratic strain in his thought because it is the only one apparent in The Opportunity in the Law,
supra note 1. For further discussion of Brandeis and technocracy, see Luban, The Twice-Told
Tale of Mr. Fixit: Reflections on the Brandeis/FrankfurterConnection, 91 YALE L.J. 1678, 16971707 (1982).
38. I have defended this idea in PoliticalLegitimacy and the Right to Legal Services, 4 Bus.
& PROF. ETHICS J. 43 (1985).
39. The legitimacy vision eventually reaches theoretical fruition in Raws' Difference Principle, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-78 (1971), as the technocratic vision does in pluralist political science.
36.
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the legitimacy vision, there is no question of a lawyer standing outside
the fray; there is no question of a lawyer sometimes siding against the
people; there is no question of a lawyer engaging in a physicist's balancing of interest groups, all of them in principle equally important. Instead, a lawyer is fully and frankly an advocate for the people, with
whom a lawyer must side, because the people occupy a privileged position in determining the legitimacy of government.
In Brandeis' view, the primary activities of progressive professionalism were to be law reform and counseling clients away from immoral
or socially pernicious projects. The legitimacy vision adds one further
activity to the roster: advocacy for "the people," in the form of legal aid
work and pro bono practice on behalf of the poor.
D. Law Reform
Beginning roughly with the New Deal, progressive professionalism
underwent a sort of mutation. It began with a momentary ascendancy
of the legitimacy vision, which soon transmuted to the technocratic vision, and eventually decayed into corruption.
The Democratic Party's coalition between farmers, labor, ethnic
minorities, and (more generally) "the people," created a new role for
lawyers sharing the legitimacy vision of progressive professionalism:
government service. Now a people's lawyer could happily become a government lawyer, because, with the election of Franklin Roosevelt, it was
a people's government. One noteworthy outcome of Brandeis' 1905
Harvard speech was the recruitment of a brilliant student, Felix Frankfurter, to Brandeis' philosophy. By the 1930s Frankfurter had become a
Harvard professor and a good friend of Roosevelt. Frankfurter put the
philosophy into practice by helping to place a large number of lawyers,
who were formerly his students, in important positions in Roosevelt's
New Deal Administration. 0
At the same time, however, that the government bar was so astoundingly active, the private elite bar disengaged itself from public
service. This separation can be explained, in part, by the uneasy and
unstable mix of the client-loyalty ethic with progressive professionalism: a large number of lawyers adhered to the former and not the latter.
In addition, there was little about public life in the New Deal to attract
Republicans. Finally, the opportunities of government service were such
as to make it more attractive to progressive professionals than remaining "behind" in private practice. Thus, the progressive professionalist
40.

.
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(1982).

50 (1958). See generally P. IRONS,
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vision was pried loose from its social base in elite law firms.
The New Deal lawyers may well have been unclear or undecided
initially about whether their version of progressive professionalism embraced the technocratic or the legitimacy vision, the latter of which was
represented in the Public Utility Holding Company Act,41 the Tennessee Valley Authority, 42 and the Agricultural Adjustment Agency under
Jerome Frank.43 Inevitably, however, government service and political
conflict blunted the "people's lawyer" edge of the New Deal lawyers,
even those who adhered to the legitimacy vision. The government lawyer, simply by working in government, was transformed from an "advocate for the forgotten man" to a detached, technocratic problem-solver.
Eventually, private practice lured the New Deal lawyers away from
government service. Peter Irons' study of eighty-two New Deal lawyers
found that only twelve remained in government service, while twothirds went into private practice. 44 They became "revolving door" lawyers, cashing in on their agency expertise and insider connections by
representing corporate clients before the agencies and lobbying on behalf of their corporate clients. In the backwash of the Michael Deaver
affair and the scores of other sordid scandals associated with the Reagan Administration, it has become abundantly clear that the revolving
door is an invitation to corruption. Nevertheless, we must remember
that the corruption in question has been with us for a long time, and
not always in the form of overt or unlawful conflict of interest. Thurman Arnold was a Jerome Frank disciple in the first New Deal and a
trust-buster in the second, only to found a private law firm that, like all
major Washington firms, devotes the bulk of its practice to navigating
business clients through the regulatory agencies that Arnold knew so
well from the inside. No one would argue that this is corruption in any
legal sense of the notion, but it is undeniable that such practice
amounts to a kind of "insider trading" in the world of power, rather
than finance, and exhibits a disquieting agnosticism about the common
good.45 Tommy "the Cork" Corcoran, whose New Deal prominence gave
41. See W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940).
42. David Lilienthal-one of the lawyers placed by Frankfurter-became the exponent of the
TVA as a form of "grass-roots democracy." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 40, at 331-33.
43. I am indebted to Robert Gordon for stressing to me the importance of the legitimacy
vision to William Douglas, David Lilienthal, and Jerome Frank.
44. P. IRONS, supra note 40, at 298-300.
45. Arnold's career is well known. For an appreciation of Arnold, emphasizing his commitment to public service-his continuity with the noblesse oblige tradition-see Fortes, Thurman
Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988 (1970). Fortas (who had been Arnold's law
partner) focuses on his firm's impressive pro bono work, and says little about the commercial side
of Arnold's practice. But even Fortas makes it clear that Arnold's stock in trade was insider expertise. "Washington know-how was in demand.. . . Lawyers who were veterans of the New Deal and
government service were presumed to be qualified to find their way through the maze, to guide and
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him the connections to become a successful lobbyist, ended his career
ignominously when Woodward and Armstrong revealed in The Brethren that he had once tried to lobby Supreme Court Justice William
Brennan on behalf of one of Corcoran's clients.46 In an uncomfortably
accurate phrase, the New Republic characterized the tertiary-stage government lawyer as "the indulgence seller.

progressive

' 47

That is the dissolution of

professionalism.4

E. Client Counseling
What about the other half of the progressive professionalist
ideal-not law reform, but client counseling on behalf of worthy social
goals? Talcott Parsons, we recall, insisted that "the lawyer stands as a
kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his clients and the
social interest, '49 a view that is also incorporated into the professional
codes. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, for example,
provides that:
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that
might result from assertion of legally permissible positions.5°

And "when an action in the best interest of his client seems to him to
assist companies which had unfamiliar problems." Id. at 991. As Fortas expounds his view, Arnold
adhered to a value-neutral role for the lawyer: "the social implications of the position to be taken
on the client's behalf were submerged by the lawyer's dedication to the value of the legal and
constitutional system as he saw it, to the duty of the advocate, and to the obligations of advocacy
in an adversary system." Id. at 996. And again: "Every person, poor or rich, criminal or corporation, is entitled to the services of a lawyer.. . . [The lawyer] should not-he may not-ignore the
basic principle of our system that the corporation, whatever the issue may be, is entitled to counsel." Id. at 997.
Dare we suggest that this alleged value neutrality is a bit disingenuous? For one thing, as
Fortas knew full well, in our "constitutional system" only criminal defendants are "entitled to
counsel," and so only criminal defense lawyers have a straightforward claim to value neutrality. In
non-criminal matters the claim of value neutrality is harder to justify. If 90% of a lawyer's clients
are women's rights plaintiffs, surely we are entitled to conclude that the lawyer's practice taken as
a whole manifests a value orientation in favor of women's rights. Who could doubt that the lawyer
is engaged in a feminist law practice? Similarly, a Washington lawyer who builds a major law firm
by representing the regulated against the regulator cannot disconnect himself from the social consequences of the practice taken as a whole by appealing to value neutrality.
46. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 79-85 (1980).
47. The Indulgence Seller, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1979, at 3 (referring to Lloyd
Cutler).
48. For a discussion of the role of lawyer-lobbyists in contemporary political corruption, see
E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NE W ROAD TO CORRUPTION 57-66 (1983).
49. T. PARSONS, supra note 28, at 384.
50. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY EC 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE];
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego such action."5 1
An early official statement of the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools on professional ethics emphasizes
52
the same points.
For obvious reasons, empirical evidence on how lawyers counsel
their clients is difficult to obtain. Erwin Smigel's 1964 study of the Wall
Street lawyer cited Parsons approvingly and suggested that the lawyers
Smigel studied lived up to this ideal of professional autonomy.5 3 Smigel
believed Wall Street firms to be wealthy enough, with a diversified
enough clientele, that they can easily weather the loss of a client; moreover, a firm can exercise leverage because the client's need for the firm
is great. 54 But Smigel offers no hard data, and the most recent research
of which I am aware points in the opposite direction. A recent survey
indicates that a large minority of 222 large-firm lawyers have never
given advice to their clients about nonlegal matters, and the bulk of
nonlegal advice that the majority of lawyers gave concerned personal
investments or business decisions, rather than public concerns (though
clearly advice about business decisions might include public concerns).5 5 Moreover, half of the lawyers who said that they had never
given a client nonlegal advice attributed this to the fact that they have
no client contact; another fifteen percent said it is not a lawyer's responsibility.5 6 Both of these explanations are devastating to the progressive professionalist model of the trusted advisor oozing with
phronesis.
One explanation for this finding is that the client counseling half of
progressive professionalism has always been largely a myth. 57 A different and incompatible explanation is that progressive professionalism
has decayed since its heyday, or even since Smigel's study. A third explanation is that the structure of lawyer-client relationships in large law
firms has changed over the last few years: in-house counsel have become
much more important and taken over the supervision, and many of the
advisory tasks, of outside counsel, which would explain why so many of
the lawyers who have never provided extra-legal advice to clients say it
51. MODEL CODE, supra note 50, EC 7-9; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 50, Rule 1.2(c).
52. Fuller & Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference of the
ABA-AALS, 44 A.BA_ J., 1159 (1958).
53. E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYE&E PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 293 (1964); see
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. E. SMIGEL, supra note 53, at 293.
55. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503, 533 (1985).
56. Id.
57. R. Gordon, supra note 3, at 30-32.
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is because they have no client contact.5 8 A final explanation is that,
phronesis or no phronesis, corporate clients just do not want their lawyers' nonlegal advice. 59
Whatever the explanation, however, the fact that lawyers do not
give their clients nonlegal advice shows why, with the decadence of progressive professionalist government practice, idealistic lawyers would
have to seek "The Opportunity in the Law" outside of establishment
institutions altogether: neither government practice nor elite private
practice offered that opportunity.

V. THE NEW WAVE OF PROGRESSIVE

PROFESSIONALISM

What I shall call the New Wave of progressive professionalist lawyers forms the dominant contemporary image of "public interest law,"
which reached its zenith in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This New
Wave practice included lawyers representing poor people, political and
cultural dissidents, and consumer and environmental interests.6 0 One
could take, as an example of the first type of New Wave practice, Gary
Bellow, who co-founded California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA), the
legal aid organization whose successes are the source of President Reagan's bitter and uncompromising hostility to publicly funded legal services for the poor. Bellow later became perhaps the most distinguished
clinical law teacher in the country, co-authored the major clinical textbook, 6' and is currently a Harvard Law School professor. William
Kunstler is probably the best-known example of the second form of
New Wave practice; and Ralph Nader is a splendid example of the
third.
One characteristic of the New Wave practice was the absence of a
Brandeis or a Heber Smith: blue-chip lawyers who became people's lawyers in their spare time. Things seemed much more of an either-or proposition-you were either on the bus or off the bus. However, it is
important to notice that the New Wave practice attracted many bluechip dropouts and law students. Jim Lorenz, who co-founded CRLA
58. On the expanding role of in-house counsel, see Chayes & Chayes, CorporateCounsel and
the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance of
Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 427-28 (1985). It is important to note, however,
that Nelson's research revealed that 65% of associates and 87% of partners do report that they
have opportunities to give nonlegal advice to corporate clients. Nelson, supra note 55, at 532.
59. The chairman of AT&T wrote that he would not want a lawyer who wished to be a
"corporate conscience." De Butts, The Client's View of the Lawyer's ProperRole, 33 Bus. LAW.
1177 (1978); see also Kagan & Rosen, supra note 58, at 423-27.
60. This typology comes from what is still the best description of the New Wave: Comment,
The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
61. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADvoCACY (1978).
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along with Bellow, began as a large-firm corporate lawyer, and described as "revolutionary" the fact that CRLA adopted the large firm's
standard of quality.2 And a glance at the first list of Reginald Heber
Smith Fellows-Legal Services Program fellowships in poverty
law-shows that, in 1967, twenty-one out of fifty fellows graduated
from the Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Yale, and Penn law schools (plus
one each from Virginia, Michigan, and Boalt Hall). 3
The reasons for this striking abandonment of establishment legal
practice are relatively clear. First, the New Wave sensibility was bottom-up democratic and rigidly anti-elitist, which meant rejecting the
technocratic vision of progressive professionalism in favor of the legitimacy vision (though, as I shall suggest, it is unclear how much progressive professionalism the New Wave lawyers were prepared to embrace
under either vision). Second, the New Wave sensibility was anti-capitalist and anti-corporate. The corporate camel was beyond salvation, incapable of passing through the eye of the needle, and the New Wave
lawyers viewed the corporate counseling function of classic progressive
professionalism as false consciousness, self-deception, or even sheer lying by professional elites concerned with preserving the myth that they
had not sold their souls. Third, the New Wave sensibility was enmeshed
in what Theodore Adorno calls "the jargon of authenticity"-a Woodstock Nation loathing of the institutional role playing expected of Wall
Street lawyers. 4 Some of the most intense debates among New Wave
'6 5
lawyers concerned whether to "dress straight.
The New Wave practices' was clearly more committed to the legitimacy vision-power to the people!-than the technocratic vision of progressive professionalism. But New Wave social theory in fact involved
deep tensions with several propositions of classical progressive professionalism, which cast doubt on whether the New Wave practice was in
fact part of the progressive professional tradition at all. The New Wave
practice had no difficulties, of course, with the rejection of commercialism (proposition one), nor with partisanship on behalf of the people
against corporate power (proposition five). New Wave lawyers may have
disagreed that lawyers have a special responsibility to the common
good (proposition three)-resolutely insisting, depending upon the nature of the lawyer's radicalism, that the responsibility belongs to everyone, or to the victims, or to the proletariat. Nevertheless, New Wave
lawyers would never have doubted that their own talents were devoted
62.
63.

Comment, supra note 60, at 1075.
The list was provided to me by Clinton Bamburger.

64. T. ADORNO, THE
65.

JARGON OF AUTHENTICITY

Comment, supra note 60, at 1137-45.

(1973).
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to the pursuit of the common good.
The New Wave lawyers' reaction to the functionalist belief that
lawyers mediate between public and private interests (proposition two)
is more complex. Some New Wave lawyers, with either a liberal-Christian or a Marxist perspective, viewed their clients' interests as universal
interests within society; thus these lawyers could advance the public interest simply by pursuing their clients' interests. Other New Wave lawyers reached the same conclusion by more mainstream analytic
strategies. Those lawyers who represented "discrete and insular minorities" could describe their activities as an attempt to perfect classical
interest-group politics by ensuring that their clients were heard in the
public forum. 6 Since discrete and insular minorities are unrepresented
in legislatures, they have no political clout; pursuing a litigation strategy allows discrete and insular minorities access to the law making process via the judiciary. Similarly, lawyers who represented consumer or
environmental interests could explain that they were responding to economic or political market failures that prevent dispersed majorities
from having a voice in either legislatures or the courts.6 7 While it is too
expensive for individual consumers with only a small stake in, say, a
rate-hike decision to organize politically, public interest lawyers can
overcome this market failure by filing lawsuits. In any case, the New
Wave lawyers would have accepted the proposition that they "mediate"
between private and public interests only in the trivial sense that they
believed that private and public interests were simply identical in the
New Wave practice.
Most problematic for New Wave lawyers would have been the idea
that the common good is achieved by blunting class conflict (proposition four). While they were likely to accept that their reformist activities would blunt class conflict, the New Wave lawyers hated the fact
that this was true. Indeed, one of their basic fears was that workingwithin-the-system reformism such as theirs would pull the fangs of The
Movement: "such work is counterproductive, in their view, for while it
can make the system slightly less oppressive, it defuses efforts for more
66. The "discrete and insular minorities" analysis originates in Footnote 4 of United States
v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and has been developed into a full-fledged theory of
judicial review in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); for a skeptical analysis, see Ackerman,

Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1985).
67. See Comment, supra note 60, at 1096-97; see also Weisbrod, Problems of Enhancing the
Public Interest: Toward a Model of Governmental Failures, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN EcoNOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 30 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978); Trubek,

Trubek & Becker, Legal Services and the Administrative State: From Public Interest Law to
Public Advocacy, in 1 INNOVATIONS IN THE LEGAL SERVICES 131-60 (E. Blankenburg ed. 1980). See
generally R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981). I develop both analytic strategies in

chapter 16 of Lawyers and Justice, supra note 11.
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radical change.""8
Lastly, New Wave lawyers would have disagreed about whether
lawyers are specially well-suited for the tasks confronting them. Some
would enthusiastically have said yes, but more radical lawyers argued
that lawyers were merely brakes and liabilities, since the primary task
confronting The Movement was political organization and direct
action. 9
VI.

THE DECLINE OF PROGRESSIVE PROFESSIONALISM

Despite these tensions with classical progressive professionalism,
there is enough overlap between the altruistic, politically charged outlook of the New Wave practice and the views of Brandeis and de Tocqueville to place them in the same tradition. De Tocqueville would have
analogized the New Wave lawyers to the radical lawyers of the French
Revolution who, he warned, would emerge whenever the government
gives lawyers insufficient influence.7 0 But the New Wave is now Old
Hat-many of the New Wave lawyers have gone back into private practice or sought refuge in law school faculties, where they are now a classic example of "old turks teaching young fogies." Since the collapse of
'60s radicalism, we have witnessed, in the last decade, a loss of faith in
the progressive professionalist vision. This loss of faith originated from
several directions. First, the populist, anti-elitist mistrust of the technocratic vision has persisted, and not just among left-leaning lawyers: in
the new conservativism, government bashing, lawyer bashing, and expert bashing (since the experts are members of the "New Class," i.e.,
liberals) are tiresome mainstays.
Second, Reaganism has launched an all-out attack on the legitimacy vision. The basic maneuver-highly visible in Ronald Reagan's
1984 presidential campaign against Walter Mondale-is to deny that
the least well-off have any kind of privileged position in determining
the legitimacy of institutions. The poor, minorities, farmers, and labor
(the New Deal coalition, "the people") are now just some more interest groups. This redefinition, of course, is fatal, because in a pure clash
of interest groups, the relatively powerless ones are inevitably doomed.
Third, the elite private bar, in the meantime, shows decreasing interest in public interest work and greater concern for the bottom line. It
is a constant refrain among elite lawyers in the 1980s that the salad
68. Comment, supra note 60, at 1094.
69. For an especially vituperative attack on the assumptions lawyers bring to radical politics,
see Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); see also Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 125 (1968).
70. 1 A. DE TOCQUEviLLE, supra note 4, at 284-85.
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days of large law firms in the 1970s are over, and that it is now necessary for large firms to become increasingly profit conscious. This profit
consciousness manifests itself in every aspect of practice, even the most
trivial. August large firms conduct their photocopying centers as profit
making enterprises; typical numbers are those of a Los Angeles firm
that bills clients twenty-seven cents a page for photocopying that would
cost ten cents a page commercially. Since corporate litigation can often
involve a million pages of photocopying, we are talking about hundredthousand-dollar rip-offs. The same firm bills clients for parking in the
firm's garage without telling the clients that it is doing so, and meters
the lawyers' telephones from the moment a call is made, so that clients
are billed for calls even when the calls are not completed.
These are the minor matters. Much more important is the insane
spiral of pressure on large-firm associates. Ten years ago associates with
whom I spoke knew that they had to bill at least 1600 hours a year to
have a prayer of making partner. Today, associates in some Washington
firms tell me that the minimum plausible amount is 2200 hours, and the
average associate bills around 2400 hours. Not every hour at work is
billed, of course, and so work days are often over twelve hours long.
These are, to say the least, tense and demanding hours. It is small wonder that associates who leave for work before their children wake up in
the morning and return home hours after the au pair has tucked them
into bed have no singular desire to busy themselves with law reform or
pro bono activities.
It is a noteworthy fact, however, that things need not be thus. A
partnership could simply hire more associates to do the same amount of
work, which would free the Nibelungen to live their own private as well
as public lives. The reason this does not happen, of course, is that to
pay additional associate salaries and overhead for the same work would
decrease partnership shares. The same reason governs the work load of
associates; since an associate is usually paid a fixed salary, but bills by
the hour, the more hours the associate bills, the more money the partners bank. The associates, who are often bringing in close to two-and-ahalf times their own salary to the partnership, acquiesce in the system
for the obvious reason that they hope someday to become partners and
share in the booty themselves. This is truly a hope against hope, for
only a few will make it. Indeed, if the associate-to-partner ratio decreases by the firm promoting a higher proportion of associates, the
level of partner incomes, for which the associates are striving, could not
be maintained.
In fact, the large law firm is one of the only institutions in contemporary America that fits Marx's theory of exploitation with no fudging
required: even the Horatio Alger ideology that "anyone can make it" is
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preserved intact like a perfectly shrunken head. The only difference is
this: the partners work as hard as the associates, with the additional
burden of bringing in business, which requires shmoozing with clients
on their off-hours. Corresponding to the intensified pressure on associates is a more competitive ethos among large-firm partners: several with
whom I have spoken said that, while in the "good old days" a partner
who was liked or respected would not suffer if he brought in fewer clients, this is no longer true. The exploiters suffer alongside the exploited; Alberich sweats beside Mime.
Small wonder that in this atmosphere progressive professionalism
does not flourish. As we have seen, the corporate counseling component
of progressive professionalism, so prominent and important in theory,
takes a back seat in practice. Robert Nelson also reports interesting
findings regarding the law-reform component. 1 Although the large-firm
lawyers Nelson studied are noticeably more liberal in their general political outlook than one would expect (surely more liberal than their
clients), the law reforms these lawyers proposed in their own areas of
expertise were almost invariably anti-liberal and in favor of their clients. Nelson comments: "[T]here is not much disparity between client
concerns and the lawyers' agenda for change in the legal fields in which
they actually practice.. . . Given an unconstrained power to change the
law, the majority would change the law to suit the interests of their
clients. 1 2 It is both sad and amusing to compare this observation with
the ABA-AALS's official statement regarding the lawyer as law reformer, which urges the lawyer to exploit the bad law on behalf of the
client but then bend his personal energies to repealing the law.7 3 If Nelson is right, this ideal lawyer would never have made partner on Wall
Street, and lawyers are least likely to suggest progressive reforms in
matters closest to their practice and expertise.
VII.

PROGRESSIVE PROFESSIONALISM AS A MORAL

DuTY

At this point my historical reconstruction draws to a close. It is
obvious that my aim in this narrative has been to promote progressive
professionalism, particularly the legitimacy vision. I believe that progressive professionalism, though by no means beyond criticism, presents
an ideal for elite law firm practice that is infinitely more attractive than
the futility, the quietism, the excruciating narrowness of law practice
that serves no purpose but to help the rich get richer. To defend this
view, unfortunately, is more than I can do here, for it would involve
71. Nelson, supra note 55, at 525.
72. Id.
73. Fuller & Randall, supra note 52, at 1162.
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defending each of the six propositions that constitute the progressive
professionalist vision. This is an argument more elaborate than I can
hope to mount in my remaining space, and in any case I accept some of
the six propositions only in a qualified form.
Instead of attempting to defend progressive professionalism proposition by proposition, I shall focus on one key point. This is the question of whether progressive professionalism, with its twin components
of law reform and client counseling, is intended as, in Lon Fuller's
phrase, a "morality of duty" and thus a competitor to the more usual
understanding of the lawyer's duty as client loyalty, or a "morality of
aspiration"-a moral ideal on a par with loving thy neighbor as thyself,
which is commendable but can scarcely be called a strict obligation. 4
Only if progressive professionalism is regarded as a morality of duty
does it signify a reevaluation of legal ethics.
I think it is clear that the progressive professionalist's call to lawyers to engage in law reform activities cannot sensibly be anything but
a morality of aspiration: the burdens and ignominies of public life are
simply too onerous, too little to most people's taste, too exceptional, for
it to make sense to call them a duty. Perhaps what Brandeis had in
mind was the circumstance that the institutions and conduits of participation in law reform-the bar associations and membership in a community's political and economic establishment-are readily available to
elite lawyers. Today, large firm lawyers are routinely involved in bar
association activities, and it would take little additional mobilization to
give these activities a progressive and reformist twist. This makes Brandeis' exhortation somewhat more understandable, but it is still an exhortation to what is above and beyond the call of duty.
What of the other half of progressive professionalism? One might
expect that client counseling, too, is supererogatory: it may be very
commendable for a lawyer to remonstrate with a client about the injustice, the harsh consequences, or the immorality of a course of action the
client wishes to pursue, but it seems mistaken to require lawyers to do
so. But here, I think, the story is very different-here, I think, the lawyer is duty-bound to take the progressive professionalist course, and in
that case it truly amounts to a changed vision of law practice.
"Client counseling" is simply a shorthand way of describing a complex kind of lawyer-client negotiation in which the lawyer brings into
play his or her phronesis in order to divert clients away from projects
that harm the common good. Client counseling may mean kindling the
clients' consciences, but more often it will mean inventing alternative
74. The distinction between a morality of duty and a morality of aspiration comes from L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1964).
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ways for clients to satisfy their interests. Sometimes it means persuading clients that the course of action they propose will harm them even
when that is not necessarily so. In other instances, client counseling will
require threatening to withdraw from a representation or refusing to
follow a client's instructions. In extreme cases, it means telling the client that if he does not back away from a course of action, the lawyer
will blow the whistle on him.
In brief, "client counseling" is an abbreviation for a morally activist
vision of lawyering in which lawyers take it upon themselves to judge
and shape client projects. This is in sharp conflict with the ethic of client loyalty, which combines extreme partisanship on behalf of the client with moral neutrality toward the client's ends and projects.7 5 It is
often suggested that neutrality is indispensable, that a lawyer cannot be
held morally accountable for her client's nefarious schemes. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct stipulate that "[a] lawyer's representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
7
political, economic, social or moral views or activities." 6
In fact, however, the principle of neutrality has come under vigor77
ous attack in recent years, and in my view is completely discredited.
Even cases that seem to require neutrality, such as the defense of vicious criminals or the representation of vile clients in order to vindicate
an important principle (for example, a Nazi's right to free speech) actually demonstrate the opposite. The criminal defense and civil liberties
lawyers point to the moral worthiness of the sixth or the first amendment to absolve themselves of moral blame. Melvin Wulf, former Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said "Our real client is the
Bill of Rights. '7 8 This statement shows that these lawyers, who deal
with cases that seem to require neutrality and nonaccountability, do in
fact hold themselves morally accountable for the principles they uphold, and excuse their furtherance of the interests of unsavory clients as
an unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of advancing principles to
which the lawyers are morally committed. That is, these lawyers appeal
75. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 29.
76. MODEL RULES, supra note 50, Rule 1.2(b).
77. I have ventured a full-scale refutation of the principle in chapters 1-8 of Lawyers and
Justice, supra note 10; the core of this argument has been published in D. LUBAN, The Adversary
System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYEm LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (1983). See also
Simon, supra note 75, in which the author convincingly demonstrates that neutrality is inconsistent with all of the major jurisprudential positions that have ventured to defend it, and the chapter on lawyers in A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980), in which
the author effectively defuses many of the counterarguments against relaxing the principle of
neutrality.
78. Quoted in Comment, supra note 60, at 1092.
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not to neutrality but to something like the just-war doctrine of double
effect.
Once these cases are seen to rely on a principle other than neutrality, the neutrality principle looks less plausible. Although space does
not permit me to rehearse the many detailed arguments that have
ruined the client-loyalty vision of partisanship and neutrality, the general point may be stated briefly-and it is a restatement of progressive
professionalism. The client-loyalty ethic requires lawyers to subordinate
the common good to the particular interests of their clients. This subordination may nevertheless contribute indirectly to the common good,
provided that the aggregate of morally worthy client projects that are
furthered thereby is greater in number and import than the morally
pernicious projects. For example, the duty of confidentiality requires
lawyers to keep client confidences even when doing so harms the common good. The duty of confidentiality may nonetheless be a good thing,
provided that the aggregate of "harmful" confidences is small compared
with that of "innocent" confidences.
Without some such favorable bookkeeping, the lawyer's partisan
role seems hard to defend. The point is not the communitarian or antiindividualist claim that everyone's projects are morally required to contribute to the common good, as though we were all always employees of
society. That is a pernicious argument. The point is rather that the legal profession in effect enters a claim that its partisan role is to be
judged by different standards than those that apply to nonlawyers. A
nonlawyer who bends his or her intelligence, judgment, and persuasive
abilities to further another person's project is an accomplice of that
other person, and must take full moral responsibility for that project.
Lawyers must justify the claim that they should be judged by a more
relaxed standard by showing that relaxing the standard serves the common good.
But there is no reason to believe that this is so: why suppose that
one-sidedly furthering client projects will generally serve the common
good? That is where the progressive professionalist solution comes in: it
compels the lawyer to act as a buffer who mediates between illegitimate
client desires and the social interest. 79 By adopting a morally activist
stance, the lawyer helps improve the ratio of worthy to unworthy client
projects, vindicating thereby the partisan role that defines the legal profession. In short, either the principle of neutrality is straightforwardly
unjustifiable, or its justification requires lawyers to adopt a morally activist stance that is inconsistent with the principle. In either case, the
79. The word "buffer" comes from T. PARSONS, supra note 28, at 384.
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partisanship-plus-neutrality vision is unsustainable, and must be replaced by something like progressive professionalism.

